Trust and Virtual Teams

I recently read a fascinating article on Virtual Success: The Keys to Leading from a Distance.  (Yes, you do need to give your contact info, but I trust the authors not to sell or misuse your email address.) Darleen DeRosa and her colleagues at Onpoint Consulting  have recently completed a study of 48 virtual teams in 16 organizations around the globe.

What they were looking for is what distinguishes highly effective virtual teams and team leaders from those that are marginally effective or completely ineffective. In the study, they’ve identified the unique challenges of the manager who has team members spread out around the globe, and the six behaviors that differentiate the highly effective virtual team managers.

Not surprisingly, communication was overwhelming cited as the key competency for the effective managers.
Building relationships, building trust, being personally accountable and having a results orientation were also cited.

Six Behaviors and Twenty-four Performance Enhancers

The study identified six behaviors and 24 specific actions of the most effective leaders; I want to concentrate on one of each.

Among the six competencies, or behaviors, one key is fostering an atmosphere of collaboration among team members.

The most effective leaders of virtual teams … establish a culture of accountability in which roles and expectations are clear and there is zero tolerance for blaming others or finger pointing. [T]eam members can raise problems and admit mistakes without fear of retribution. … Effective leaders of virtual teams build an environment of trust within the team, which further enhances collaboration.

And my own favorite enhancer, under Support, Engagement and Recognition is this one:

Focus on moving from task-based trust to interpersonal trust by communicating openly and honestly, leading by example, employing consistent team interactions, and being accessible and responsible.

I love the notion of moving from task trust (“I trust that Mark will get his piece done on schedule”) to interpersonal trust (“I trust that Mark will raise a flag if he sees any difficulty, and will keep me fully in the loop. And if I ask for his help on this problem that has me stumped, I know I’ll get help, discretion and no attitude.”)

All of this adds up, it seems to me, to creating a safe atmosphere akin to what we call Intimacy and Transparency. And that adds up to true collaboration.

 

The Difference Between Wrong and Illegal

Do you know the difference between a wrong action and an illegal action? If you don’t, you are not alone. But neither are you to be trusted. 

The Valukas Report

The Valukas Report was commissioned by a US court to determine the causes of Lehman’s bankruptcy. Made public last week, it has caused a bit of stir in certain quarters—including Wall Street, lawyers and accountants.

In a nutshell, the report accuses Lehman of using an accounting technique (called Repo 105) to temporarily move assets off its balance sheet just before quarter’s end, in order to show lower leverage ratios, then moving the assets back on-balance-sheet shortly after the end of the quarter. See details here.

The auditors of Lehman Brothers were Ernst & Young. Lehman’s source of legal advice for the Repo 105 tactic was the venerable British law firm Linklaters. Both are critized in the Valukas report.

The Financial Times headlined the story thusly: "Damning Insight into Corporate Culture Sheds Light on Fall of a Wall Street Giant." The story quotes one ‘senior Wall Street executive’ as saying, "I almost threw up when I read the report; it makes me sick of this industry."

Let’s stipulate that this is the language of “wrong,” at least for Valukas, the Financial Times, and one Wall Street executive. What should be the response of the various parties?

Responses to Charges of Wrong Doing

Let’s start with Dick Fuld, Lehman’s former CEO. His lawyer is quoted as saying

Mr Fuld did not know what those transactions were – he didn’t structure or negotiate them, nor was he aware of their accounting treatment. Furthermore, the evidence available to the Examiner shows that the Repo 105 transactions were done in accordance with an internal accounting policy, supported by legal opinions and approved by Ernst & Young, Lehman’s independent outside auditor.

And what does auditor Ernst & Young have to say

Last week, the group defended its signing-off of Lehman’s 2007 accounts and maintained the books were "fairly presented in accordance with [US] generally accepted accounting principles."

The Valukas report also criticized Linklaters, saying that “Lehman’s … turned to Linklaters for a legal opinion blessing the use of so-called "Repo 105" transactions when it could not obtain a suitable opinion from US lawyers.”

Here’s what Linklaters has to say

"The examiner’s report into the failure of Lehman Brothers includes references to English law opinions which Linklaters gave in relation to a number of Lehman transactions. The examiner . . . does not criticise those opinions or say or suggest that they were wrong or improper. We have reviewed the opinions and are not aware of any facts or circumstances which would justify any criticism."

Wrong is from Mars, Illegal is from Venus

Pick your own planetary metaphor: the point is that “wrong” is a moral concept, “illegal” is a legal concept–and key players in our global economy have come to brazenly deny the distinction.

The Valukas report resonates as a moral indictment. But the responses are from Planet Law.

When the charge of “wrong” is routinely answered by “it’s not illegal”—and we accept it–it means something is seriously wrong with our moral culture.   

The Financial Times blames the “US box-ticking culture.” 

It is far easier for an accountancy firm to retain a lucrative relationship with its clients if it does not sit in judgment on their activities, but simply adheres to a set of blind rules. Auditors can more easily defend lawsuits when things do go wrong if a rule book can be appealed to. But this is precisely why the whole system is so frustrating from the investors’ perspective. The more rule-driven auditors are, the less valuable their work is as due diligence.

Jim Peterson, a noted accounting commentator, talks about the failure of the massive Sarbanes/Oxley legislation to prevent just this moral meltdown:

A program of airport security will lack credibility, if so broadly applied as to deprive ordinary citizens of their ability to carry a bottle of wine or a tube of toothpaste, but that fails to identify terrorists whose deadly threat is limited only by their inept inability to detonate their shoes or their underwear.

Sarbanes/Oxley suffers the same defect: if it could not detect and deter an “outlier” on the scale of Lehman, then what beneficial effect can its proponents claim it has accomplished, by imposing an intrusive system of box-ticking on the vast bulk of corporate registrants?

Some recommend changing regulations.  Others suggest structural changes.  Still others recommend more enforcement.  But all these solutions have limitations; in particular, they are trying to solve a moral problem with more laws.  But this only exacerbates the issue.

You can’t solve a moral dilemma with more laws. There will always be a Dick Fuld, or a Lehman, willing to push beyond moral boundaries using absence-of-illegal as a sleight of hand.  It’s up to us to call them on it.

NYTimes columnist, David Brooks, is right in saying, “The only way to restore trust is from the local community on up.”  It starts with people explaining to politicians, lawyers, newspaper editors and managers that just because it isn’t illegal, doesn’t mean it isn’t wrong.

Get mad: but get morally, not legally, mad. 

 
 

 

Becoming a Trusted Advisor Program: New York, April 22-23

It has been a few months since we last saw each other for the Trust Summit this past fall with Chris Brogan, Julien Smith, David Maister and myself.

I wanted you to be the first to know about a new workshop we at Trusted Advisor Associates are holding in New York. It’s about what it takes to establish yourself as trustworthy and how to apply those teachings to your everyday business affairs.

On April 22 and 23, we’re bringing the “Becoming a Trusted Advisor” program to New York City, where you or your staff can learn first-hand how to:

  • Understand and apply three models that are the foundation of all trust relationships
  • Recognize the four essential elements of trust and raise your scores on all of them
  • Identify the two biggest pitfalls of trust creation and use specific strategies to avoid them
  • Apply a socially acceptable way to put hard truths on the table
  • Become unstuck on at least on thorny relationship.

Our programs are lively, interactive and practical. Here’s what participants from the December program had to say:

  • “Beautifully executed . This is an important ‘rounding out’ skill set for potential leaders, especially those overly focused on technical skills.”
  • “One of the most impactful programs I’ve been part of.”

Reserve your seat now, as seating is limited and we expect this program to fill up quickly.

Program price for the two days is US$2295. Sign up before April 1 for early bird discounted price of $1995 (contact Tracey DelCamp ([email protected] for the early bird).

CLICK HERE TO REGISTER (http://trustedadvisor.com/TAP.April2010)
or
contact Tracey DelCamp ([email protected])

Thanks and best wishes,

The Trust Reader Volume 4

Greetings, and welcome to this month’s ebook, Volume 4 of the TrustReader. The TrustReader series announces the publication of new articles on the Trusted Advisor website. This month, we delve into the concept of what effects over-measurement and value can have on a business. From the most recent Olympics, contest shows, and more we seem to be knee-deep in rating systems. But is it possible that the ever-growing need to rank our business practices and relationships can in fact be a deterrent?

In this edition of the Trust Reader Volume 4 we feature:

  • Metrics: Over-measuring Our Way to Management
  • Why Value Propositions are Overrated
  • The Point of Listening is Not What You Hear, But the Listening Itself

GET THE TRUST READER VOLUME 4 HERE

I welcome your comments, and hope your entry into Spring is as welcome as the warmer weather.

The Trust Reader Volume 4

Greetings, and welcome to this month’s ebook, Volume 4 of the TrustReader. The TrustReader series announces the publication of new articles on the Trusted Advisor website.

This month, we lead with the effects over-measurement and value can have on a business. From the most recent Olympics, contest shows, and more we seem to be knee-deep in rating systems. But is it possible that the ever-growing need to rank our business practices and relationships can in fact be a deterrent?

The lead article explores this theme by looking directly at measurement itself. The other two articles reflect a similar theme; what we lose when we rely too much on abstract, quantified approaches to business.

In this edition of the Trust Reader Volume 4 we feature:

  • Metrics: Over-measuring Our Way to Management
  • Why Value Propositions are Overrated
  • The Point of Listening is Not What You Hear, But the Listening Itself

GET THE TRUST READER VOLUME 4 HERE

I welcome your comments, and hope your entry into Spring is as welcome as the warmer weather.

Peter Firestein on Trust, Character and Reputation (Trust Quotes #4)

Peter Firestein’s extraordinary career began in Indiana. He soon left for California, taught himself Spanish in a park in Mexico, learned commodities in Latin America, and has a unique resume, having worked for Michael Milken and advised the Brazilian Government on privatization of its national phone company.

Peter ended up counseling mega-global companies on corporate reputation and Investor Relations. His book ranges both wide and deep; you can’t summarize Peter’s insight and wisdom briefly. But I do try to pick out a few themes in this interview.

CHG: Peter, Let me put the onus on you: what strikes me most about the book is perhaps the role of personal character and of relationships in dealing with mega-corporate institutional relationships. It’s tough to summarize such a broad book, but how do you see it?

PF: You’ve actually done a pretty good job with your question, Charlie. I try to suggest in the book that the job of leading a significant company these days requires involvement of the whole person, not just the part of the person trained to analyze, fix, and build businesses.

People who’ve reached the point of development where they’re considered capable of leading companies are attuned to making decisions on the basis of metrics. You don’t get there unless you understand return on investment, for example. That’s always been true, and it’s never been more important than today.

But the world requires something more of you now. Modern information technology makes enormous amounts of intelligence on businesses available to anyone who can use a search engine. For companies, there’s no longer any place to hide. In addition, having information conveys to any citizen a sense of entitlement to register opinions and organize opposition to companies whose actions seem out of line with common values.

The good news: any manager with sufficient maturity to run a company also has enough life experience to understand how people outside the company feel themselves affected by its actions. But too many otherwise competent corporate leaders don’t understand that these two sides of life are not only connected—they’re inseparable.

That’s what I mean when I say that, in the end, it’s all personal. In a post-modern world where everyone seems not only to have an opinion, but the eloquence to express it, being the boss doesn’t make you immune; it makes you vulnerable. The moment you take that to heart, you’ve made your first step toward resolving conflicts with your antagonists. Leading is, first of all, listening.

CHG: One thing that struck me was the insistence on reputation as being built inside out: the only sensible strategy is to be the company you want your stakeholders to see.

PF: One of the book’s early titles was “The Glass House,” meaning, of course, that you can’t fake things for very long any more. Just thinking about the failed obfuscations attempted by some big corporations in recent years can bring actual, physical pain.

When I say you have to “build reputation from the inside out,” I mean that managers have to create reporting and communications structures that not only disseminate values throughout the organization, but absorb the workforce’s on-the-ground experience all the way to the top. Every action the company takes, therefore, represents its core value system. And the workforce’s day-to-day reality informs senior decision-making.

I call this “vertical communication,” and I think it reduces the likelihood that a CEO will wake up some day to find that a regional manager has been found to have bribed a government official, or a sub-contracted factory is discriminating against female employees, or an accidental dump of toxic waste has disappeared from company records somewhere down the line.

There are few small failures in big business. In fact, the depth of failure often presents a mirror image of success that preceded it. True vertical communication that extends throughout the organization helps you spend your life thinking about other things.

The legal disclaimer on any financial offering warns that past performance does not indicate future results. With human beings, it generally does.

CHG: Since this blog focuses on trust, please tell TrustMatters readers how you see the relationship between trust and reputation?

PF: If there’s a difference between high trust and strong reputation, I’m blind to it. Both trust and reputation—whether high or low—are expectations of future experience based on what is known about the past. That’s how people differ from markets. The legal disclaimer on any financial offering warns that past performance does not indicate future results. With human beings, it generally does.

CHG: You provide a very real-world example of exactly how a big company should go about recovering from a reputational slip, and what impressed me about it was your recommendation of aggressive, pro-active engagement. Say more about that?

PF: Here’s how pro-active you ought to be. You start preparing for the next crisis five years before it happens. And you don’t need a crystal ball for this. If you’re a multi-national company of scale, it’s impossible to avoid reputational mishaps. Some day, somewhere, someone will—intentionally or by neglect—commit a reputation-compromising act in your name. The inevitability must be an integral part of your thinking. So, you have to have a culture in place well in advance that enables you to respond appropriately to events that never crossed your mind before they happened.

People call it crisis communications, but it’s much more than that. Communications, by itself, never fixed anything. People also call it crisis management. But the crisis has already occurred, so the opportunity to manage it is past. You could call it management of the aftermath, and the only way to manage the aftermath effectively is to participate in it.

Which means, to some degree, participating in the emotions of those you have harmed. Referring to a person in the CEO position, the corporation becomes the person, and vice versa. If, as an individual, you have empathy toward a family who’s lost a father or a mother, you have to show that same empathy as a corporation.

Beyond this, the best piece of advice available on the subject is to resist the temptation to let your lawyers protect you. They can’t. There’s a short list of companies that have come out of disasters with stronger reputations than they’d had before. In all cases, they did so because they were able to identify with those who were angry with them. Enlightened leadership means understanding there’s no Plan B.

CHG: Let me challenge you on one small item: you assert that the most important constituency is investors, though you also advocate systematically managing a wide variety of stakeholders. Isn’t investor turnover increasing radically these days? Does that diminish your point?

PF: The building of reputation can’t be about anything but what motivates management – and that has to do with investors’ willingness to value the shares at higher levels. Turnover? If someone’s selling, someone else is buying.

There’s no altruism in business, nor should there be. But the cold fact these days is that sustainable behavior means supporting legitimate social interests. You don’t have to like it, and you don’t have to take a “nice” pill to do it. It’s just business, but business has changed. Here’s where investors’ interests enter the social sphere: A company facing a social and regulatory headwind is likely to have higher capital costs and less-than-certain chances of strategy execution.

Investors don’t like that. It’s not the job of a corporation to address social interests—except where doing so is the only avenue to making business successful. And that’s already become the normal condition in most industries. I just read a wonderful quote by a Canadian union official named Stephen Hunt who, in a speech about social responsibility in mining, could have been referring to any industry when he said: “A mining company is only as good as its opposition.”

CHG: You’ve dealt with dozens, maybe hundreds, of CEOs. What has been the most common blind spot or weakness you have seen regarding good reputation management?

PF: It may be my sunny disposition, but I can’t remember at the moment meeting a business leader who wasn’t driven by earnest good intentions. Sure, I’ve known my share of indicted folks; but I liked them, too. There’s something about giving yourself over to a goal that’s not that different from love of family. It’s personally attractive.

I had the great good fortune to grow up in the Sovereign State of Indiana, and it wasn’t until I was in my thirties and working in a New York trading company that I came to realize that high intelligence in a person does not necessarily equate to noble intentions.

Because you are using the world to build wealth, the way you treat that world will follow you.

The most common blind spot (since you asked) is a lack of balance, which I guess can be closely associated with laser focus on a goal. Perhaps a better way to describe it is to call it a lack of context. Because you are using the world to build wealth, the way you treat that world will follow you. It wouldn’t hurt us to remember once in a while that American native populations held profound respect for the game they had to kill in order to live.

I once sat down to a dinner meeting between a CEO and equity analysts in an elegant New York hotel. The CEO was among the most prominent European industrial titans of the last half century (a client). His dozen or so guests were invited there to eat and ask him questions. He opened the conversation this way: “My father taught me,” he said, “that to make a living, you have to rub other people.”

He was assuring them of his accessibility. There was no imaginable reason for him to endure their earnest self-importance had he not wished to. He didn’t need them. But hosting them reflected his idea of how the world worked. There was no amount of esteem or money that could free you from the need to engage.

CHG: You have a fine sense of the historical about you. We’ve been through this kind of business reputation downturn before, certainly in the US. What’s different this time? What should we learn from the past?

PF: The past can be a deeply misleading subject because there isn’t much that hasn’t happened in it. If we’re talking about the past experienced by those of us who have come of age since World War II, in which America emerged triumphant in an otherwise devastated world, there’s a strong argument suggesting that’s the most unrepresentative of all the pasts available for our consideration.

One thing we’ve learned from the past is that the notion that things are different this time provides an assured road to ruin—as does a sense of invincibility and the belief that we’re smarter than those who have come before.

The reputation of business—as cyclical as anything else—will continue its descent until a new ideal appears to propel it upward again. Perhaps the last ideal that floated the reputation of business involved the building of the industrial world and the opening of the West. Dust from the explosion of that ideal is still settling around us. Perhaps the next upswing will come from the ideal of restoring the environment—in other words, from respect for the same earth the last ideal wrecked.

It is certain that we don’t get to decide these things for ourselves. In trying to come to terms with the cycles of sentiment, I have taken comfort in a phrase coined by New York Times Columnist David Brooks. The term is “epistemological modesty” and refers to the inescapable fact that, no matter how hard we try, we really don’t know very much. Everyone’s familiar George Santayana’s saying: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." Not being much of a comedian, Santayana forgot his punch line: “So are those who can remember it.”

CHG: Let’s imagine this blogpost got forwarded to 50 CEOs. On the whole, on the average, what are the top 2-3 things CEOs need to hear?

PF: Sir or Madam CEO: I have nothing but good news for you. It is this: You have more control over the fate of your company, your reputation, and your career than you imagine.

Do you look at your critics—the trigger-happy media, activists with a bone to pick, investors and analysts who just don’t get it—and tell yourself that not one of these people has ever run a company for a day? So, how could any of them understand what you’re trying to accomplish?

In their lack of fairness lies your advantage. During the latter part of the 20th Century, when anti-tobacco activists tried everything they could think of to put cigarette makers out of business, their nearly constant companion was a Philip Morris public affairs executive named Steve Parrish. He spoke at their conferences and kept in close touch with the principals of organizations that opposed him.

While absorbing all their slings and arrows, he offered them a continuous flow of new information about the manufacture of smoking products, including the companies’ efforts to reduce their deadliness. He discussed regulation of the industry, which eventually came to pass. The result was that—whether we like it or not—tobacco companies survive as a highly-profitable business.

Parrish’s strategy was to increase his adversaries’ knowledge of the tobacco industry—a counterintuitive approach if there ever was one. The byproduct of this flow of information was that he continually moved the goal posts on them, preventing closure of the argument despite an extraordinarily hostile environment and an enormous consensus against him.

CEOs have at their disposal one of the modern world’s most powerful weapons: Information. Gifted corporate leaders will use it to engage adversaries, induce them to invest in dialogue to the point that it cannot reasonably be abandoned, and, by that route, achieve a workable consensus. If companies whose products kill you can do this, why can’t anyone?

CHG: How much difference can individuals make?

PF: Excluding natural disasters, change comes from nowhere but individuals. Historical forces, wars, financial trends, market bubbles and collapses, the discovery of penicillin, and the invention of cheap global digital communication as well as post-modernist art can all be summed up in single word: Behavior. Even mass behavior has to start with an individual—a notion that may lead us to one definition of leadership.

CHG: In your book, you carry on an extended discussion about how very good companies, at least for a period of time, seem to lose direction. Merck during its Vioxx episode is one example you explore. You also suggest a concept called “Structural Corruption.” What’s this about, and what insight can you offer about the mechanism by which some companies seem inexplicably to turn south?

PF: I use Merck as an example because it was a fantastic company for over a century and is a truly admirable one today. But Merck’s Vioxx interlude, during which it seemed to want to overturn the last 400 years of the scientific method by subordinating disclosure of pharmacological research to the desires of its marketing department, shows how even great companies can become confused when they allow commercial factors to cloud their judgment.

The scientific method says you base conclusions on observed fact. Merck hid harmful side effects of its drug in order to sell more of it. I maintain that the people inside the company would never have behaved this way in their private lives. Their judgment suffered from an insularity within the company that distorted their frame of reference. There was a kind of “echo effect” at work in which people gradually talked each other into highly inadvisable actions—and many inside and outside the company suffered.

I came up with the term “structural corruption” to describe an impossible situation in which managers sometimes find themselves when their industry’s fundamental business model goes illegal. This describes parts of the insurance industry a few years ago when Marsh & McLennan enrolled its competitors in a scheme to rig bids for big institutional contracts and pay out illegal commissions. You couldn’t compete unless you played the game.

So, imagine a manager who’s invested his or her life in building a career in that sector, and has done so by behaving ethically, and then has to contemplate giving it all up in order to maintain a hard-won reputation. Imagine a similar manager trying to win a contract in a foreign country in which he or she is competing against a company domiciled in a place where the government winks that the payment of bribes to win business.

The concept of “structural corruption” is useful in distinguishing the dynamic in which even managers with the highest standards of conduct can become victimized by secular ethical trends. The questions people face in such circumstances can be life-changing. One secular ethical trend lies behind the Great Recession that began in 2008 and whose end is not yet convincingly in sight. But that’s another story.

+++++

CHG: It’s been a real pleasure meeting and talking with you; anyone interested in buying Peter’s book, which I recommend can find it here: Crisis of Character: Building Corporate Reputation in the Age of Skepticism

This is number 4 in the Trust Quotes series.

The entire series can be found at: http://trustedadvisor.com/trustmatters.trustQuotes

Recent posts in this series include:
Trust Quotes #3: Dr. Eric Uslaner on the Nature of Trust
Trust Quotes #2: Robert Porter Lynch on Trust, Innovation and Performance
Trust Quotes #1: Ross Smith of Microsoft

How to Soft Sell a Hard Drive

I love my computer tech guy. He’s smart, savvy and responsive. Never lets me down. And even though I’ve got a small business, without servers and multiple users or even using his enterprise server, he treats me the same as he does his larger clients. 

 

While he was logged in fixing my computer problem, he told me a story about a new client. He got a call from a local company looking for a replacement drive for a server. He’s not in the parts business, and could have simply told them that. But that’s not David Winter of Winter Solutions. Instead, he asked them about their problem and its impact because he was concerned and wanted to help. He learned that the hard drive crashed, and business was at a standstill. He asked who was helping them through this crisis, and learned they were dealing with it themselves. They were going to order a new hard drive, and anticipated they would have to re-enter a year of data over several weeks. They found David on line in their search for a hard drive.   

 

David just happened to have a drive on hand that would fit their server, and offered to get it to them that day, and install it.  If they just bought the hard drive, there wasn’t a lot of money in this for David, and maybe not even a new client. But that wasn’t the point. By genuinely caring and trying to help them, they decided to have David assist, and in 48 hours, he recovered the original hard drive data, got the business back up and may have landed a significant client.

 
Makes me want to recommend him to everyone I know. 
 

 

Too Big to Trust? Or Too Untrustworthy to Scale?

This will be my fourth week on the road; more on that later in the week. At least all that plane time (and waiting in lines time) makes for good reading time—thanks to the iPhone Kindle Reader app.  (and no they don’t pay me for saying it).

I’m re-reading Francis Fukuyama’s 1995 classic Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity

It’s the perfect companion for Andrew Ross Sorkin’s Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves. 

Here’s why they belong together.

Fukuyama’s View of Trust

Fukuyama makes a compelling case that economic development is strongly affected by the cultural norms of a society—in particular, the propensity to trust. In this, he is up against both neo-classical economists (who argue people are rational utility-maximizers), Marxians (who argue it’s all about the money), and a ton of management theorists (who pretty much believe both).

As Fukuyama puts it:

The Chinese, Korean and Italian preference for family, Japanese attitudes toward adoption of non-kin, the French reluctance to enter into face-to-face relationships, the German emphasis on training, the sectarian temper of American social life: all come about as the result not of rational calculation but from inherited ethical habit.

Who we trust, it turns out, radically determines the nature of business we engage in. He explains why large French companies are state-owned, and why Chinese companies find it hard to hire professional management (think Wang Laboratories). 

Fukuyama describes several cultures in the world–southern Italy, chunks of Russia, some Chinese regions—which contain high-trust pockets of communities within a broader society of low-trust intermediate institutions. 

Those high trust pockets? Think the Mafia, Chinese tongs, and street gangs.

Their values? Fierce loyalty toward each other, coupled with a level of competitiveness bordering on paranoia regarding other competing pockets and the world at large.

See where this is going?

Too Big to Fail?

Andrew Ross Sorkin’s book is riveting reading, a blow-by-blow account of who said and did just what to whom during the extraordinary market meltdown that brought down Lehman Brothers, resulted in the TARP legislation, and nearly brought the world financial system to a full stop.

Part of the charm is sorting out the black hats and the white hats; maybe I should say black and shades of gray.

Paulson and Geithner emerge as the flawed heroes. Jamie Dimon plays to the crowd, but is also the only really good manager of the lot, and the only one to show flashes of true industry leadership and something resembling responsible social behavior.

The rest, frankly, resemble refugees from a failed Sopranos casting call. Jimmy Cayne, John Mack, and Dick Fuld in particular come off as mob leaders, with Goldmans’ Lloyd Blankfein coming off better only because of a better sense of a world beyond New York. 

Wall Street as Low Trust Culture

The majority of suggestions to reform Wall Street focus on four solutions:

1.structural cures (e.g. separate investment and commercial banking functions),

2.regulatory cures (e.g. prescriptions for capital ratios),

3.enforcement (e.g. tougher sanctions, more investigative staff for the SEC),

4.compliance (more procedures).

None of those critiques draw the conclusion that feels obvious if you’ve just read Fukuyama: that the dominant model of leadership on Wall Street has been pretty much like the Mafia—or the Sopranos, anyway. Wall Street has been run by a cabal of low-trust, tribal, familistic gang leaders. 

The inability to work as a group when the industry was threatened; the tendency to circle like cannibalistic sharks when there’s blood in the water; the pathological obsession with ‘enemies’ (the most hated being the short-sellers, who as near as I can tell were never shown by anyone to have done any significant harm and who in fact did a lot of good, but were nonetheless the villain of choice); the celebration of loyalty coupled with the ability to flip allegiances on a dime. All these are traits of low-trust cultures.

A trader once told me how he was recruited. 

“The guy from [Big Wall Street Firm] walked into a room of 25 expectant recruits, and said, ‘Who here is motivated by fear and greed?’ Me and another guy raised our hands timidly. ‘The rest of you can go home,’ he said, ‘I’m only interested in these two.”

So how do these clowns get so much power? Amid all the defeatist models that posit human beings as innately susceptible to money, that assume selfish motives are immutable and can only be beaten by more rules and rewards, I still think there is a valid role to be played by culture and character. 

There are more than a few moments of perspective, responsibility and decency shown in Sorkin’s book by Geithner, Paulson and Dimon. Why aren’t there more players like them?

In Sorkin’s final pages, he warns that we’re already letting the opportunity for genuine reform slip by—and not just regulatory and structural reform either. But, he says:

Perhaps most disturbing of all, ego is still very much a central part of the Wall Street machine. While the financial crisis destroyed careers and reputations, and left many more bruised and battered, it also left he survivors with a genuine sense of invulnerability at having made it back from the brink. Still missing in the current environment is a genuine sense of humility.

Whether an institution—or the entire system—is too big to fail has as much to do with the people that run these firms and those that regulate them as it does any policy or written rules. 

Amen to that, Mr. Sorkin. We cannot afford these low-trust types wandering around with their hands on the financial world’s throat.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

The Wrong Elevator Speech: Disaster and Recovery

This is week three for me of a four-week road trip. I’m getting a little loopy, but am collecting some wonderful client experiences, lessons and stories. Here’s one from a British account executive.

“I was going to see a potential client for what could have been an important piece of business for us. Unfortunately for me, I missed the scheduled plane by minutes, and thus was delayed by an hour. I called, and they agreed to reschedule the meeting to accommodate me.

“When I arrived, a bit flustered, the team of a half-dozen clients execs had gathered downstairs, and we all then went to the lift to go upstairs to the designated conference room.

“Unfortunately the lift was made for about four people. We all crammed into the lift, and it slowly began to climb. At that point someone—how shall I put this—well, as we English say—passed gas. The lift continued its crawling pace upward. No one, of course, said a word, nor even altered their expression. There was dead silence.

“As the doors finally opened, we all rushed to get out—all at once. And all 7 of us thereby tumbled onto each other on the floor. We all picked ourselves up, even more embarrassed, and again without saying a word to each other, made our way into the conference room.

“As I set up at the head of the room, I could feel the weight of this triple discomfort: I was late, the tumbling all over each other—and of course the ‘gas’ incident in the middle. It was all contrived to create a mutual sense of misery.

“What to do? I stood in the front of the room and said, ‘Gentlemen, little did I know this morning what a fine level of intimate relationship we should all achieve in so little time here this afternoon. I am honored indeed.”

“Well fortunately, everyone fell all over each other laughing; I had somehow managed to prick the balloon of the unspoken that hung over us like a cloud, and the rest of the day went marvelously. And oh yes, we got the sale.”

What this gentleman had done, in our nomenclature, was to Name It and Claim It; that is, to speak aloud the one thing that no one could figure out how to talk about. He did it with humor—an excellent tool—and was rewarded for the relief he caused by an appreciative relationship, and even a sale.

How many of us waste moments like that, buried in our own fear of speaking the truth? And how many sales do we leave on the table because of it?

 

Dr. Eric Uslaner on the Nature of Trust (Trust Quotes #3)

My guess is not many TrustMatters blog readers recognize the name Eric Uslaner. Nevertheless, it would be hard to overstate his importance in the field of trust. Dr. Deborah Nixon, a trust academic herself, says, “Uslaner is arguably the leading academic in the field.”

A professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, Eric is the author of The Moral Foundations of Trust: in my opinion, a superb work. There’s more, much more, but you can get it at his website.

Now, let’s talk trust.

CHG: Dr. Uslaner, thanks so much for taking the time to be with us. I’m delighted to be able to share a taste of your work with TrustMatters readers.

Let’s start with something deceptively simple: what is trust?

EMU: There isn’t one concept of trust. Most of the time we talk about trusting someone to do something specific—do I trust my doctor to take care of my health? I don’t ask if he can be trusted to paint my house.

But there is also a form of trust that doesn’t depend upon evidence or experience—what I call “moralistic trust.” This is the belief that we can trust people whom we don’t know and who may be different from ourselves. This is the sort of trust that helps societies solve key problems. It is more based upon our belief that we ought to trust people—the Golden Rule—than our experiences with people we know well and who may look and think like ourselves.

CHG: Why does trust matter and why should we trust people we don’t know?

EMU: Trust leads to many positive outcomes. Trusting people are more tolerant of people unlike themselves. They are not more likely to have friends or to join groups—misanthropes have friends too and we all tend to join groups of people just like ourselves. But trusting people are more likely to give to charity and to volunteer for causes that help people who are different from themselves.

And trusting societies are less corrupt, have lower crime rates, are more open to trade, and have higher levels of economic growth. They are more open to globalization and new technologies. Such societies also have higher levels of internet usage and scientific innovation. Trusting people are more accepting of risk. They may be more vulnerable to risky situations, but they are also in the best position to profit from taking greater risks. Mistrusting people may protect themselves by avoiding risk, but trusting people are the ones who will reap the biggest profits.

CHG: Aren’t we safer trusting people like ourselves?

EMU: If we only trust people like ourselves, we miss out on the best opportunities. Many years ago Mark Granovetter wrote about “the strength of weak ties,” where we are more likely to prosper by dealing with people we may not know well. Ronald Burt has written about “structural holes,” where open networks lead to far better outcomes than closed networks.

The companies that perform the best generally bring together people of different backgrounds so that each can learn from each other. If we only trust people we know—or people like ourselves—we risk the problem of “groupthink,” where we become convinced that our positions are correct because our friends and colleagues agree with us. There is no corrective for bad advice. Putting trust in people who are different from us is a stronger path to innovation and prosperity.

CHG: Are all types of trust equally good?

EMU: Aside from “strategic trust” (or trust based upon evidence to do specific things), we also have generalized trust—trust in strangers who may be different from ourselves—and “particularized trust,” when we only trust people like ourselves. This in-group trust is far more common in the world—and it has negative consequences.

CHG: Negative consequences–interesting.  So not all trust is positive?

EMU: That’s right–particularized trust as a substitute for generalized trust is a negative for a group.  If a group limits its trust, it results in closed minds, cultures, and economies.

CHG: What first drew you to the topic of trust?

EMU: I first got interested in trust when I was looking for an explanation as to why there is so much incivility in Congress. Congress, I argued, is much like the rest of us—the incivility in Congress reflects the declining trust among the public.

CHG: Are some groups of people more trusting than others?

EMU: The most trusting people are the Nordics—both in the Nordic countries and here (in Minnesota and the Dakotas). The Nordic countries have a long history of greater equality and that is why they are the most trusting.

CHG: What does the Bernie Madoff saga tell us about trust?

EMU: Not that much about trust in people, but more about trust in institutions—especially trust in financial institutions (banks, brokerage firms) and to some extent trust in government (for not being on top of the case).

CHG: Is it true that we live in a time of declining trust? Trust in what?

EMU: There has been declining trust in government for many years, but trust in government is cyclical. It was very low in the 1970s but revived under Reagan, then fell, and came back under Clinton, and then fell. Trust in government reflects our level of satisfaction with the economy and our international stature. Trust in people has been declining since the 1970s and has not revived at all. Trust in people tracks the increasing level of inequality in the US very strongly.

CHG: What can be done by business or government to increase trust?

EMU: Focus on two key things: Inequality and education. Business isn’t going to like the argument that it must take steps to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, but this is the single biggest factor in whether societies are more or less trusting—over time in the US, across the American states, and across countries.

People don’t see a common fate with each other when inequality is high. Business can take a small step in the right direction by limiting the huge disparities in salaries. The huge bonuses investment houses have been giving their employees after getting government bailouts bring inequality to the forefront of people’s attention. These firms are creating social tensions that may come back to bite them.

Government needs to focus more on inequality. Education is the single biggest individual factor leading to greater trust for two reasons.  First, higher education brings us in contact with people of different backgrounds and exposes us to the roots of different cultures.  So more highly educated people are more willing to accept people of different backgrounds because they understand cultural differences. 

Second, universal public education leads to lower levels of inequality–and also to lower levels of corruption (as I show in my book, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law).  Greater equality and lower corruption foster trust in people who may be different from ourselves.

CHG: What’s the biggest misconception about trust that you find people have?

EMU: That trust is fragile, or that it can be reestablished easily. Moralistic (or generalized) trust is learned early in life, from your parents, and it remains stable for most people throughout their lives. So you can’t break trust easily.

But neither can you build it so easily. You need to do it early, and you need to get kids to interact with people of different backgrounds.

CHG: Eric, thank you so much for taking the time to share your research and thoughts with us; it is poweful stuff, and I deeply appreciate it.

This is the third installment of Trust Quotes, our series featuring interviews with leading thinkers and practitioners in the world of trust: people who apply trust in powerful ways in business and society.

This is number 3 in the Trust Quotes series.

The entire series can be found at: http://trustedadvisor.com/trustmatters.trustQuotes

Recent posts in this series include:
Trust Quotes #2: Robert Porter Lynch
on Trust, Innovation and Performance
Trust Quotes #1: Ross Smith of Microsoft on Trust and Innovation